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Abstract
This article presents a perspective which focuses on the right
to access information as a mean to ensure a non-discrimina-
tory character of algorithms by providing an alternative to
the right to explanation implemented in the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). I adopt the evidence-based
assumption that automated decision-making technologies
have an inherent discriminatory potential. The example of a
regulatory means which to a certain extent addresses this
problem is the approach based on privacy protection in
regard to the right to explanation. The Articles 13-15 and
22 of the GDPR provide individual users with certain rights
referring to the automated decision-making technologies.
However, the right to explanation not only may have a very
limited impact, but it also focuses on individuals thus over-
looking potentially discriminated groups. Because of this,
the article offers an alternative approach on the basis of the
right to access information. It explores the possibility of
using this right as a tool to receive information on the algo-
rithms determining automated decision-making solutions.
Tracking an evolution of the interpretation of Article 10 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Right and Fun-
damental Freedoms in the relevant case law aims to illus-
trate how the right to access information may become a col-
lective-based approach towards the right to explanation. I
consider both, the potential of this approach, such as its
more collective character e.g. due to the unique role played
by the media and NGOs in enforcing the right to access
information, as well as its limitations.
1 Introduction
The discriminatory potential of automated decision-
making solutions has been debated for some time now.
Yet, it has only recently received more attention because
of the growing, and sometimes contentious, capacities of
algorithmic solutions. Publications such as Weapon of
Math Destruction1 or Automating Inequality: How High-
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Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor2 inform
the broader audience on the threats created by the
profiling and algorithms to the most vulnerable groups
in society. The fact that algorithms often tend to repro-
duce human biases and, therefore, to repeat existing dis-
criminatory mechanisms inspires the search for solu-
tions that could guarantee the transparency of automa-
ted decision-making processes.
One of these solutions is the right to explanation. The
controversy concerning the right to explanation was
sparked by colliding opinions on the existence of this
right in the General Data Protection Regulation3 (here-
inafter GDPR) and the scope of the GDPR’s provisions.
The right to explanation can be briefly described as
tools that allow the person who is subjected to automa-
ted decision-making to be informed about this fact and
about the reasoning standing behind this decision. Its
function is to provide an individual with instruments
that would allow to avoid the discriminatory potential of
automated decision-making solutions. The boundaries
of this concept’s embodiment in the GDPR provoke
discussion among scholars triggering the need to search
other solutions that may address the threats and chal-
lenges posed by the discriminatory potential of automa-
ted decision-making solutions.4 In the article, I present
an alternative approach on the basis of perceiving algo-
rithms as information.
I argue that the right to access information could be
considered as a more collective-based5 alternative to
right to explanation. The motivation for seeking such an
alternative results from limited scope of the right to
2. V. Eubanks, Automating Inequality. How High-Tech Tools Profile,
Police, and Punish the Poor (2017).
3. Regulation 2016/679, OJ 2016 L 119/1.
4. In favour of a presence of the right to explanation in the GDPR:
B. Goodman and S. Flaxman, ‘European Union Regulations on Algorith-
mic Decision-Making and a “Right to Explanation”’, 2016 ICML Work-
shop on Human Interpretability in Machine Learning (WHI
2016)https:// bit. ly/ 2wchh2x (last visited 4 May 2018); against such a
possibility: S. Wachter, B. Mittelstadt & L. Floridi, ‘Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation’, 7 International Data Privacy Law 76
(2017).
5. Under the term ‘collective-based’ and ‘collective’, I understand (1) the
special role of media and NGOs, which has been recognised especially
by the European Court of Human Rights when realising the right to
access information; (2) the character of explanation, which not just
refers to a particular individual, but rather offers a model-centric
explanation, thus referring to the system, not to the particular decision.
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explanation implemented in the GDPR. I examine the
legal possibilities of achieving model-centric explana-
tion.6 Under this term, I understand the solutions that
would allow to infer how a system of automated deci-
sion-making is structured, for example, inform on all
the factors that are taken under consideration in a cer-
tain automated decision-making system, their weights,
method of assessing the results and so forth. The article
is an attempt to examine the possibilities and the limits
of applying the right to access information as a way to
realise the right to explanation. This would allow us to
avoid, to a certain extent, the discriminatory treatment
that could result from automated decision-making
implemented by the state. The current analysis is
indeed strictly focused on automated decision-making
solutions that are linked to the state’s operations and
constitute the examples of state’s ‘monopoly of
information’. Such limitation is warranted by the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights (herein-
after ECHR) on which I base my arguments. Even
though the ECHR broadened the interpretation of Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Right and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter Europe-
an Convention),7 it is debatable if and to what extent the
said article is applicable to private entities. Although I
do not intend to exclude the possibility of using the
approach on the basis of the right to access information
in a broader range of situations (e.g. concerning horizon-
tal relations), this article focuses specifically and solely
on automated decision-making that may occur in the
state’s operations. In this vein, the article aims to pri-
marily present the reasoning justifying the usage of the
right to access information so that a model-centric
explanation of automated decision-making solutions
used by states is made available for scrutiny.
In order to achieve this goal, the article is structured as
follows. The second section starts with some initial
remarks on the potential sources of discriminatory treat-
ment in case of automated decision-making. It presents
the characteristics of the prohibition on discrimination
in EU law and, by doing so, the scope of application of
the reasoning developed in the article: this includes
exploring the relation between, on the one side, the
European Convention and its interpretation and, on the
other side, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (hereinafter Charter)8 and its impact
on the European law. The third section provides an
overview of the possible limitations arising from the
approach based on the right to explanation as set out in
the GDPR. This would stress the need of having fur-
ther legal means in order to achieve higher level of auto-
mated decision-making transparency. The section ends
with the reasons why there is a need to approach the
6. For the explanation of model-centric approach: L. Edwards and
M. Veale, ‘Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an Explanation”
to a “Right to Better Decisions?”’, 16 IEEE Security & Privacy 46
(2018).
7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 4 November 1950, ETS No. 005.
8. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2012 C 326.
automated decision-making discriminatory potential
from a more collective perspective. The fourth section
discusses the right to access information in the Europe-
an law. In this section, the evolution of the interpreta-
tion of Article 10 of the European Convention is presen-
ted. Its aim is to assess the possibility of using the right
to access information whereby states’ institutions
employ automated decision-making, for example, when
providing health services, benefits for the unemployed
or the recruitment processes in case of public education.
The goal of this section is to present the reasoning
standing behind the argument that the right to access
information can, to a certain extent, constitute an alter-
native to the right to explanation. The fifth section con-
cludes.
2 Discriminatory Potential of
Solutions Using Automated
Decision-Making
2.1 Technological Perspective on
Discriminatory Potential of Automated
Decision-Making Solutions
It is important to notice that the discriminatory poten-
tial of automated decision-making has several sources.
There are two main sources of concerns, which result
from the methods used while preparing solutions allow-
ing automated decision-making. The first one is the
character of data used to develop the algorithms. The
second one is the choices that are made when deciding
which of the collected data should be perceived as
important factors influencing the final result of process-
ing.9 Automated decision-making is – paradoxically –
resistant to social changes. Firstly, the input is histori-
cally biased: as data on which decisions are based are
historical, they can be inherently burdened with preju-
dice against minorities.10 Secondly, the decision which
of the analysed data should be considered as important
is a matter of choice. Machine bias,11 which is the result
of the necessary choices made when testing the pro-
gram, is the result of the necessity to subject data to
generalisation in order to achieve any meaningful
9. Though these two reasons differ, when analyzing certain cases, they
usually appear to be linked to each other.
10. ‘However, when the input data used by the algorithms are generated
by human beings, even algorithms become susceptible to human bia-
ses.’ – M. Ahsen, M. Ayvaci & S. Raghunathan, ‘When Algorithmic Pre-
dictions Use Human-Generated Data: A Bias-Aware Classification Algo-
rithm for Breast Cancer Diagnosis’, forthcoming at Information System
Research, at 2 (2017) https:// bit. ly/ 2LQXzj6 (last visited 30 July 2018).
11. This has been subjected to research as early as 1980. Conclusion of the
T. Mitchell’s study was, ‘If biases and initial knowledge are at the heart
of the ability to general beyond observed data, then efforts to study
machine learning must focus on the combined use prior knowledge,
biases, and observation in guiding the learning process. It would be
wise to make the biases and their use in controlling learning just as
explicit as past research has made the observations and their use.’
T. Mitchell, ‘The Need For Biases in Learning Generalizations’, Techre-
port, at 3 (1980) https:// bit. ly/ 2IkB6t0 (last visited 4 May 2018).
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results. Therefore, the categorisation and segmentation,
when trying to create automated decision-making solu-
tions, is necessary. However, it must not be forgotten
that the choice of what criteria are used for the categori-
sation are not neutral. Allowing artificial intelligence to
analyse the discriminatory present, in order to make
automated decisions that determine the future, causes
the impression of objectiveness. Lack of human input
into this process could be perceived as a tool for making
it fairer. However, one should not forget who provides
data and tools for analysis.12
Referring to the example of algorithms that should sup-
port crime prevention, one can say that the selection of a
post code as a meaningful variable illustrates the
machine bias problems.13 As it is known that certain dis-
tricts are inhabited mostly by people of colour, using
this variable to assess the risk that the individual may
pose in the future has highly discriminatory potential.14
Another example is the usage of automated decision-
making technology to determine what kind of support
unemployed person should get: the variables that are
taken into account might affect the kind of help that one
gets.15 Arbitrary selection of the meaningful variables
may lead to the discrimination of certain groups in the
society based on their ethnicity, gender and so forth,
thus repeating the discriminatory mechanisms that exist
nowadays.
The described mechanisms refer to groups of individu-
als who share a common characteristic. The discrimina-
tory potential of automated decision-making solutions
may therefore have an impact on whole groups, being a
potential threat for collective discrimination. However,
it can be questioned whether the concept of dividing
individuals into groups must necessarily involve
discrimination. One could argue that the mechanisms
that caused the segmentation of individuals and led to
12. As V. Eubanks puts it, ‘Once the big blue button is clicked and the AFST
[Allegheny Family Screening Tool] runs, it manifests a thousand invisible
human choices. But it does so under a cloak of evidence-based objectiv-
ity and infallibility’, above n. 2, at 316 [epub edition].
13. More on the discriminatory character of automated-decision making
solutions in the context of crime prevention: ‘Profiling and data mining
may seem to work up to a point, but inevitably lead to actions against
very large numbers of innocent people, on a scale that is both unac-
ceptable in a democratic society…’ – D. Korff, ‘New Challenges to Data
Protection Study’, Working Paper No. 2: Data Protection Laws in the
EU: The Difficulties in Meeting the Challenges Posed by Global Social
and Technical Developments 2010: 52; study conducted by ProPublica:
J. Angwin, J. Larsona, S. Mattu & L. Kirchner, ‘Machine Bias. There’s
Software used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And it’s
Biased Against Blacks’, ProPublica (2016) https:// bit. ly/ 1XMKh5R (last
visited 4 May 2018).
14. Abovementioned mechanisms allow scholars to claim, ‘The use of algo-
rithmic profiling for the allocation of resources is, in a certain sense,
inherently discriminatory: profiling takes place when data subjects are
grouped in categories according to various variables, and decisions are
made on the basis of subjects falling within so-defined groups. It is thus
not surprising that concerns over discrimination have begun to take root
in discussions over the ethics of big data’ – B. Goodman and S. Flax-
man, above n. 4, at 3.
15. For more information on this topic: J. Niklas, K. Sztandar-Sztanderska &
K. Szymielewicz, Profiling the Unemployed in Poland: Social and Politi-
cal Implications of Algorithmic Decision Making (Warsaw 2015)
https:// bit. ly/ 1PrMorh (last visited 7 May 2018).
differentiated treatment have always been somehow
present. Therefore, the collective discrimination –
which can be the result of the above-mentioned mecha-
nisms – is not a unique phenomenon that appears when
applying automated decision-making solutions. More-
over, one could argue that it is too early to accuse the
technologies that are being developed of discriminatory
potential. However, what makes the segmentation in the
digital space different from the one in the traditional
services sector are the numerous obstacles to the trans-
parency of the divisions that are implemented, for
example, intentional concealment by states and corpora-
tions or lack of adequate technical and digital literacy of
the individuals. From the legal perspective, the obsta-
cles for reaching transparency are, for example, regula-
tions that ensure protection of intellectual property and
trade secrets that are necessary to protect the profits of
companies developing such solutions.16 The conflict of
interest between subjects making profit – in terms of
both monetary character and the efficiency of the pro-
cesses – thanks to the use of databases and algorithms
and the subjects of decisions that are based on big data
analysis, will have an impact on the process of spreading
automated solutions. As the number of areas in which
algorithms are used grows,17 so grows the disproportion
in knowledge on automated decision-making between
the broader public and narrow groups of specialists. As
a result, these processes produce the need to provide a
regulatory framework that would ensure compliance of
automated decision-making solutions with the general
prohibition on discrimination.
2.2 Discriminatory Potential of Automated
Decision-Making Solutions and the
Prohibition on Discrimination in European
Law
The above-described discriminatory potential of auto-
mated decision-making solutions may be perceived as
– to a certain extent – a threat to the prohibition on
discrimination in the European law. This section pres-
ents the character of the prohibition on discrimination
in the European law. In doing so, it also presents the
scope of the usage of the reasoning, which I present in
the article.
On the basis created by the European Convention, the
prohibition on discrimination on the grounds indicated
in the Article 14 refers to the enjoyment of the substan-
tive rights that are guaranteed by the European Conven-
tion itself. To a certain extent, the scope of the prohibi-
tion was expanded by Protocol 12 to the European Con-
vention.18 According to Protocol 12, the ban on
discrimination covers any right that is guaranteed at the
national level, even where this does not fall within the
16. For elaboration on some of the obstacles regarding the transparency of
automated decision-making: J. Burrell, ‘How the Machine “Thinks”:
Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms’, 3 Big Data &
Society 1 (2016).
17. For complex enumeration of such branches and analysis of the algo-
rithms’ impact on society in popular science: O’Neil, above n. 1.
18. Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 2000, ETS No.177.
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scope of a European Convention.19 As only a few coun-
tries ratified Protocol 12, the level of protection against
discrimination differs across Europe. The consequences
of the possible usage of the right to access information
in cases referring to the automated decision-making are
as follows. In countries that are parties of the European
Convention, the case would have to refer to the right to
access information on the functioning of discriminatory
automated decision-making system in the area covered
by the substantive rights guaranteed by the European
Convention. The hypothetical example could refer to
the usage of the right to access information on the func-
tioning of the automated distribution of cases between
judges in relation to the possible threat to the realisation
of the right to fair trial.20 In countries that ratified Pro-
tocol 12, the case could additionally refer to rights guar-
anteed at the national level. In both possibilities, the
right to access information would serve as a tool to real-
ise effectively another right that must have been endan-
gered due to the possible discriminatory treatment.
In terms of the prohibition on discrimination in the EU,
the relevant provision is set out in Article 21 of the
Charter. The scope of prohibition on discrimination
refers to the EU’s institutions and bodies actions and
the actions of the Member States when implementing
the EU’s law.21 It is necessary to note that according to
the Charter the content of rights should be understood
in accordance with the ones guaranteed by the European
Convention.22 Additionally, selected areas and grounds
of potential discrimination are covered by the equality
directives: the Employment Equality Directive,23 the
Racial Equality Directive,24 the Gender Goods and
Services Directive25 and the Gender Equality Direc-
tive.26 The character of the prohibition of
discrimination for the EU law may also be enshrined by
the fact of recognising it as a general principle of the EU
law: ‘The principle of equal treatment is a general prin-
ciple of EU law, enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter,
of which the principle of non-discrimination laid down
in Article 21(1) of the Charter is a particular expres-
19. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights/Council of Europe,
Handbook on European Non-Discrimination Law. 2018 edition at 18
(2018).
20. For a similar argument see M. Matczak, ‘List do Trybunału Sprawiedli-
wości Unii Europejskiej ws. praworządności w Polsce’ (2018) https://
bit. ly/ 2Fw6pRz (last visited 4 November 2018).
21. Art. 51, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, above
n. 8.
22. Art. 52, ibid. This is also the reason why in the article I focus on the
analysis of the content of the ECHR’s case law referring to the relevant
article.
23. Which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, reli-
gion or belief, age and disability, in the area of employment: Council
Directive 2000/78/EC, OJ 2000 L 303.
24. The Directive prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity in
the context of employment. Moreover, it refers also to the access to the
welfare system, social security, and goods and services: Council Direc-
tive 2000/43/EC, OJ 2000 L 180.
25. The Directive Council Directive 2004/113/EC, OJ 2004 L 373.
26. The Directive refers to the equal treatment in relation to social security:
Council Directive 2006/54/EC, OJ 2006 L 204.
sion.’27 However, it must be noted that the overall mate-
rial scope of prohibition on discrimination in the EU
law remains limited:
the material scope of specific non-discrimination pro-
visions in EU law is often quite limited and uneven.
For example, whilst Directive 2000/78/EC only
applies in the field of employment and occupation,
the material scope of Directive 2000/43/EC is con-
siderably broader, also including e.g. employment-
related social security, further access and supply of
goods and services, and other matters such as educa-
tion and social advantages. The only exception to this
is the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
nationality, which applies in the full scope of EU
law.28
As the result of such a character of the prohibition on
discrimination in the EU law, the reasoning presented
in the article might be used in case of automated deci-
sion-making implemented by the EU’s institutions and
bodies. Moreover, it could be used in case of the EU’s
Member States in the areas covered by the EU law. The
scope of the possible discriminatory treatment resulting
from the usage of automated decision-making solutions
would have to refer to the grounds on which
discrimination is prohibited in this area. The exception
would be, as indicated in the quote above,
discrimination on grounds of nationality. The character
of ban on discrimination on grounds of nationality is
more general. If interpreted in accordance with the case
law analysed in this article, the right to access
information might provide a tool to check if the automa-
ted decision-making solutions implemented by the state
is within the area of the EU law. The right to access
information could provide an insight into the question if
automated decision-making solutions implemented by
the state and concerning, for example, employment or
access to vocational education as guaranteed by Direc-
tive 2000/43/EC are not a source of a discriminatory
treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, religion or
belief, age or disability.
Before presenting the arguments that support such a
hypothesis, it is necessary to present the regulatory sol-
utions proposed so far to deal with the issue of potential
discrimination resulting from the automated decision
making. Such a solution is the right to explanation as
implemented in the GDPR. The analysis of the said
right is the heart of the next section.
27. Para. 43, Case C-356/12, Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, [2014],
ECLI:EU:C:2014:350.
28. Ch. Tobler, ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination under the ECHR and EU
Law A Comparison Focusing on Discrimination against LGBTI Persons’,
74 Zeitschrift für auslandisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht at
532 (2014).
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3 Right to Explanation: An
Approach Based on the Data
Protection Framework
3.1 Right to Explanation in the GDPR
The term and concept of the right to explanation has
been developed as a tool to ensure privacy protection
and should – for now – be understood mainly as an ele-
ment of data protection law. The discriminatory charac-
ter of automated decision-making procedures is to a cer-
tain extent addressed at the EU level by the GDPR.
The data subject, according to the Articles 13-15 of the
GDPR, should be informed about:
the existence of automated decision-making, includ-
ing profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and,
at least in those cases, meaningful information about
the logic involved, as well as the significance and the
envisaged consequences of such processing for the
data subject.29
The Articles 13-15 of the GDPR refer to, respectively,
information that is to be provided where personal data
are collected from the data subject, information that is
to be provided where personal data have not been
obtained from the data subject and the right of accessing
data by the data subject. The common provision regard-
ing ‘meaningful information’, which should be delivered
to the data subject, can be perceived as a step towards
increasing the level of consciousness of individuals in
the area of automated decision-making. To a certain
extent, these obligations may address the above-men-
tioned issue of insufficient digital literacy. However, the
lack of precision regarding the scope of ‘meaningful
information about the logic involved’ leads to a broad
informational obligation that seems difficult to pin
down.
Moreover, the possibility of combating online
discrimination on the basis created by the GDPR is
weakened by the fact that – as a general rule – the
GDPR allows both automated individual decision-mak-
ing and profiling.30 According to the GDPR, the data
subject is granted the right ‘not to be subjected to a
decision based solely on automated processing, includ-
ing profiling, which produces legal effects concerning
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or
her’.31 The threshold set for the possibility of opposing
the automated decision-making is relatively high. First-
ly, this right refers to a decision, not to the processing
itself. Therefore, it allows developing technologies that
may be discriminatory and introduces its control on the
last level of the process, when the decision in question
has been already made. The adopted form of the GDPR
does not address the problems that result from the lack
29. Arts. 13-15, above n. 3.
30. Profiling in GDPR is presented as a special category of individual deci-
sion-making: Art. 22, ibid.
31. Ibid.
of the automated decision-making technologies’ trans-
parency, from the perspective of the individual. Second-
ly, Article 22 of the GDPR refers to a decision based
solely on automated processing. As a result of such
phrasing, decisions predominantly based on automated
processing would be excluded from its scope.32 This
may significantly limit the number of decisions that may
be questioned on the basis guaranteed by the GDPR.
Thirdly, doubts should be raised with regard to the
understanding of the denotation ‘similarly significantly
affects’. The impact of the decision may differ depend-
ing on the individual conditions of, for example, eco-
nomic or social character. The phrasing implemented in
the GDPR can strengthen the role of discretion in the
process of assessing the decision’s character. Moreover,
there are three grounds on which automated individual
decision-making can be justified33 – including the user’s
consent – which make it even more difficult to visualise
the potential impact of Article 22 as threatening the
practices of automated decision-making and profiling in
the web. Even though the GDPR provides grounds to
debate the right to explanation and its character, it
seems to offer limited possibilities to effectively address
the challenges linked to the discriminatory potential of
automated decision-making technologies.
Having said that, it is necessary to note two additional
factors that provide motivation for searching alternative
legal means to ensure a non-discriminatory character of
the digital space. The first is the extent to which the
logic involved in automated processing should be
revealed to the data subject. As is stated in recital 63 of
the GDPR, ‘that right should not adversely affect the
rights or freedoms of others, including trade secrets or
intellectual property and in particular the copyright
protecting the software’.34 The unrestrained develop-
ment of data-driven35 economy and high level of per-
sonal data protection is hardly achievable, which can be
illustrated by the above-mentioned example of limiting
the initial scope of the GDPR’s Article 22: the protec-
tion against automated decision-making refers to the
decision based solely on automated processing, which
leaves aside the decisions based predominantly on auto-
mated processing. On the one hand, it does not impede
the possibility of developing solutions using automated
decision-making as the vital factor influencing certain
decision. On the other hand, due to such phrasing the
individual’s right to explanation may cease to have any
real effect.
The second problem is predominantly individual char-
acter of the right to explanation included in the GDPR.
32. The authors of ‘Why a right to explanation of automated decision-mak-
ing does not exist in the general data protection regulation’ point out
the evolution of the proposed scope of the Art. 22. The legislative pro-
cess led to the exclusion of denomination ‘predominantly’ from the final
version of this legal act: S. Wachter, B. Mittelstadt & L. Floridi, above n.
4, at 92.
33. Art. 22(2), above n. 3.
34. Ibid., Rec 63.
35. M. Mandel, ‘Beyond Goods and Services: The (Unmeasured) Rise of the
Data-Driven Economy’, Progressive Policy Institute: Policy Memo
(2012) https:// bit. ly/ 2FLBcVk (last visited 4 May 2018).
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Even the phrasing, namely the term ‘automated individ-
ual decision-making’, shows its focus on an individual
perspective: it is the individual who is subjected to the
decision in question. It is the individual who can object
to the decision based on automated decision-making.
Such an approach somehow leaves aside the question of
a possible collective character of discriminatory practi-
ces, which are based on big data analysis. Simultaneous-
ly, so-far-identified and described impact of the
machine bias when implementing the automated deci-
sion-making solutions shows that it affects the minori-
ties and the most vulnerable groups in the society.36 The
possibility of collective discrimination resulting from
automated decision-making should provoke questions
about the legal means in the GDPR, which can allow to
combat such threats.
3.2 Doubts Concerning the Collective
Dimension of the Right to Explanation in the
GDPR
In case of automated decision-making one should ask:
what if ‘I’ is also a ‘we’? What if this particular decision
that has been taken in one case is in fact representative
for a whole group in the society, which has been defined
on the basis of big data analysis? The tension between
personalisation and big data–based technologies
becomes more evident nowadays: the individualisation
of content presented to individuals is only possible due
to the analysis of data of millions. Defining common
characteristics allows to undertake actions in scale of
millions of individuals. Effectiveness of profiling is the
result of the algorithms’ being fed enormous data collec-
tions. Therefore, one could wonder what law can offer
in terms of applying right to explanation in order to
address the collective dimension of discriminatory
potential and risks posed by the automated decision-
making technologies. In terms of the GDPR’s provi-
sions, one could evoke Article 35. It refers to carrying
out a data protection impact assessment if it is likely to
result in high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural
persons.37 However, it must be noted that impact
assessment is not addressed to the broader public. It
does not empower the users or groups of users, and it
does not allow the users or groups of users to take any
control over the process of assessing the potential
impact of data processing. As such, it does not consti-
tute an element of the right to explanation.
Considering the GDPR’s collective dimension, it is nec-
essary to examine Article 80.38 It allows the data subject
to mandate a not-for-profit body, organisation or associ-
ation to lodge the complaint on its behalf. Moreover,
Article 80(2) provides the Member States of the EU
with the opportunity to grant anybody, an organisation
or an association referred to in Article 80(1) independ-
ently of the data subject’s mandate, the right to lodge a
complaint and to exercise certain rights included in the
36. For detailed case study, see: Eubanks, above n. 2.
37. Art. 35, above n. 3. Art. 35(3) includes list of three cases in which
impact assessment shall be required.
38. Art. 35, ibid.
GDPR.39 However, this representation refers to the
rights granted in the GDPR and therefore the limits to
the right to explanation apply to the proceedings initi-
ated on the basis of Article 80. They focus on the partic-
ular decision referring to the individual. The abstract
control, understood as a legal equivalent of the above-
described model-centric explanation, potentially per-
formed by an NGO may, but does not have to, be
allowed by the Member States. This can lead to a con-
clusion that in the GDPR there are no obligatory legal
means that ensure transparency of the overall mecha-
nisms standing behind automated decision-making solu-
tions. There is only a slight possibility for single indi-
viduals to receive information on the grounds of a deci-
sion about their own individual case. However, it is not
possible for a potentially discriminated group to exam-
ine in abstracto the systemic dimension of automated
decision-making solutions and their discriminatory
potential. The discretional power of the Member States
on this matter could prevent the potential development
of tools which would allow wide engagement of the civil
society organisations in issues related to the right to
explanation. Therefore, I propose to analyse to what
extent the right to access information may fill the
GDPR’s shortcomings. Does focusing not on ‘data’
itself but on ‘information’ may strengthen the users’
position? May it result with providing the individuals
with the insight into the logic standing behind the auto-
mated decision-making solution? May it be a tool used
for receiving model-centric explanation instead of one
focused on a particular decision?
3.3 Right to Explanation in the GDPR and Right
to Access Information: The Necessity of
Shifting from Individual- to Collective-
Based Approach
It is necessary to note that the above-mentioned right to
explanation in the GDPR technically could refer both to
the overall system functionality focused on a certain
group (model-centric explanation)40 and to the specific
decisions concerning an individual.41 The term used in
Articles 13-15 of the GDPR, namely, ‘logic involved’,
could – if interpreted broadly – provide the user with
more general information on the system that allows
automated decision-making. However, it might as well
refer solely to the elements of the system, which had an
impact on the decision concerning individual in the par-
ticular case. As the approach presented in the GDPR
seems to suggest, the information on the logic involved
in the processing should predominantly help to under-
stand why this particular ‘one’ was subjected to a certain
decision. This approach – more probable when one
takes into account the valuable character of programmes
39. For detailed analysis of this issue: L. Edwards and M. Veale, ‘Enslaving
the Algorithm: From a “Right to an Explanation” to a “Right to Better
Decisions”?’, 16 IEEE Security & Privacy 46 (2018) https:// bit. ly/
2IDsBcO (last visited 12 February 2019).
40. L. Edwards and M. Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm? Why a “Right to an
Explanation” Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For’, 16
Duke Law & Technology Review 18 (2017).
41. Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, above n. 4, at 78.
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used to perform activities leading to automated deci-
sion-making – contradicts the attitude presented by
some scholars regarding the specific character of big
data analysis: to a certain extent collecting and process-
ing data may lead to ‘learning nothing about an individ-
ual while learning useful information about a popula-
tion’.42 Far from espousing such a one-sided approach, I
would argue that big data–based technologies cause a
feedback loop effect: as growing collection of data on
individuals increases the possibilities of identifying
group characteristics, the detailed characteristic of a
group allows to complete an individual profile on the
basis of information about the group, to which one
seems to belong. Referring to the term used by M. Hil-
debrandt,43 this can lead to the creation of ‘non-distrib-
utive group profiles’: assigning one to a certain group on
the basis of selected characteristics of an individual
(selected personal data). Even though there may be sig-
nificant determinants that are not taken into account,
and which could change the way in which one is classi-
fied, they are not considered as valid for such a classifi-
cation.44
The limitations of the approach based on the personal
data protection can be stressed by evoking the Court of
Justice of the European Union’s (hereinafter ECJ) case
law concerning personal data. In the case YS v. Minister
voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel the ECJ notices that
‘the data in the legal analysis contained in that docu-
ment, are “personal data” within the meaning of that
provision, whereas, by contrast, that analysis cannot in
itself be so classified’.45 The analogy with automated
decision-making system shows that the individual may
receive access to the personal data used to make a deci-
sion and to the decision itself; however, the analysis
remains outside the scope of the term ‘personal data’
and therefore cannot be subjected to such an access.
The concept of personal data involves the possibility of
linking certain information with a particular individual,
for example, one’s name and surname, e-mail address
containing one’s surname and place of work or IP
42. C. Dwork and A. Roth, ‘The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Pri-
vacy’, 9 Theoretical Computer Science 211, at 215 (2013). Similarly:
‘We should acknowledge the change, and accept that privacy is a public
and collective issue’ – P. Casanovas, L. De Koker, D. Mendelson &
D. Watts, ‘Regulation of Big Data: Perspectives on Strategy, Policy, Law
and Privacy’, 7 Health and Technology 1, at 13 (2017); and ‘predictions
based on correlations do not only affect individuals, which may act dif-
ferently from the rest of the group to which have been assigned, but
also affect the whole group and set it apart from the rest of society’ –
A. Mantelero, ‘Personal Data for Decisional Purposes in the Age of Ana-
lytics: From an Individual to a Collective Dimension of Data Protection’,
32 Computer Law & Security Review 238, at 239 (2016).
43. M. Hildebrandt, ‘Profiling: From Data to Knowledge. The Challenges of
a Crucial Technology’, 30 Datenschutz and Datensicherheit at 548
(2006).
44. Which is the effect of above-mentioned source of potential
discrimination, namely the choices made during the meaningful varia-
bles data selection.
45. Joined Cases C-141/12 and C-372/12, YS v. Minister voor Immigratie,
Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v.
M and S., [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081.
address.46 As explained earlier, the source of potential
discrimination in case of automated decision-making
solution may not be linked to the individual and his or
her personal data: it may be the result of how the partic-
ular automated decision-making system was structured.
In order to achieve effective protection against the pos-
sible discrimination, it is necessary to shift from the per-
spective focused on an individual and personal data to
the perspective that focuses on a group and the
information on how the automated decision-making
system works. The advantage of the solution based on
the right to access information is its more systemic
approach towards the prohibition on discrimination.
Taking into consideration the material scope of the non-
discrimination provisions in the EU law explained earli-
er, its possible usage might be illustrated with the fol-
lowing example of the potential discrimination on
grounds of nationality. The approach based on the right
to access information would allow, for example, to check
if the automated decision-making solution, which is
implemented by the state, is somehow determined to
result with the unequal treatment of the country’s citi-
zens and the nationals of the other Member States due
to the factors that are taken into account when analysing
data. It would allow to determine whether the systemic
solutions based on automated decision-making and
implemented by the Member State, are in accordance
with the prohibition on discrimination.
The next section presents reasoning standing behind the
hypothesis that the right to access information might be
a tool to achieve such a model-centric explanation,
focused on exploring the discriminatory potential of
automated decision-making solution, instead of being
focused on protection of individual’s personal data,
which in fact only fuels the automated decision-making
solution.
4 Right to Explanation: An
Approach Based on the
Right to Access Information
4.1 Right to Access Information as a Human
Right: Evolution of Interpretation of the
European Convention’s Article 10
Recognising the right to access information as a human
right is not obvious. Even though Article 10 of the
European Convention and Article 11 of the Charter pro-
vide the individuals with the ‘right … to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers’,47 only in
46. Case C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [2016],
ECLI:EU:C:2016:779.
47. The phrasing of ECHR and the Charter is in this regard the same. The
content of the Articles is similar to the Art. 19 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (‘to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers’) – Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, General Assembly resolu-
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2006 has the ECHR begun to interpret Article 10 of the
European Convention broadly. The ECHR’s judge-
ments stress the conditionality of the right to access
information and therefore remain behind other human
right bodies, for example, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, which have already recognised a self-
standing right to access information.48 The reason for
such temperance is the grounds on which the broad
interpretation of Article 10 is based. The ECHR’s inter-
pretation results not from the literal reading of the
European Convention. It is mostly the result of broad
consensus that can be observed regarding the right to
access information both on the international level and
on the level of the domestic laws of the overwhelming
majority of Council of Europe Member States.49 In this
section, I present the selected case law that illustrates
the change in the ECHR’s approach towards the right to
access information and the general tendencies concern-
ing the ECHR’s interpretation of the right to access
information, which can be drawn from the analysed
cases.
The recognition of a right to access information in the
ECHR’s case law dates back to 2006. The case Sdružení
Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic50 concerned
information demanded by a non-governmental organisa-
tion about a nuclear power plant. Even though the
ECHR decided that essentially technical information
about the nuclear power station51 did not reflect a mat-
ter of public interest, it opened the possibility of inter-
preting Article 10 of the ECHR as a source of demand-
ing access to administrative documents from public
institutions. The shift that came with Sdružení Jihočeské
Matky v. Czech Republic is unprecedented. Even though
Article 10 offers several reasons for which the scope of
tion 217 A; and the Art. 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (‘this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice’) – International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 16 December 1966, General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI).
Lack of the verb ‘seek’ in the European Convention results with doubts
concerning the possibility of interpreting the Art. 10 as containing the
right to access information. These doubts are illustrated by the evolu-
tion of the case law presented in the article.
48. ‘…the Court finds that, by expressly stipulating the right to “seek” and
“receive” “information,” Article 13 of the Convention protects the right
of all individuals to request access to State-held information, with the
exceptions permitted by the restrictions established in the Convention’ –
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile,
Judgment, 19 September 2006, para. 77.
49. ‘The Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and must, […], be
interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law, of which it
forms part. Moreover, […] the Court may also have regard to develop-
ments in domestic legal systems indicating a uniform or common
approach or a developing consensus between the Contracting States in
a given area’ – Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary (2016) No.
18030/11, para. 138.
50. Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. Chech Republic, ECHR (2006) No.
19101/03.
51. It is worth noticing that the roots of direct recognition of the right to
access information can be linked to the protection of the environment.
It has been implemented in Art. 4 of Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Jus-
tice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, UNTS 2161 at 447.
information shared publicly may be limited,52 the over-
all attitude towards the right to access information has
changed. The right to access information has been rec-
ognised as an element of Article 10: as a rule – under
certain conditions – the public should be given access to
the relevant information, and as an exception the limita-
tions to this rule could be evoked.
The confirmation of such a notion can be found in Tár-
saság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary.53 The Hungarian
NGO requested the Constitutional Court to grant them
access to the complaint pending before it. The Constitu-
tional Court denied the request, explaining that a com-
plaint could not be made available to outsiders without
the approval of its author on the basis of the protection
of the Member of Parliament’s personal data. The
ECHR explicitly stated, ‘The Court has recently
advanced towards a broader interpretation of the notion
of freedom to receive information and thereby towards
the recognition of a right of access to information’.54
Due to the public character of the information reques-
ted by the NGO, the ECHR confirmed that denying
access to the complaint was a violation of Article 10.
The occasion to strengthen the trend of broad interpre-
tation of Article 10 resulted from the proceeding initi-
ated by the Austrian non-governmental organisation
demanding access to decisions regarding transfers of
ownership of agricultural and forest land in Tirol: Öster-
reichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaf-
fung Eines Wirtschaftlich Gesunden Land- und Forst-Wirt-
schaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. Austria.55 According to the
judgement,
the applicant association was therefore involved in
the legitimate gathering of information of public
interest. Its aim was to carry out research and to sub-
mit comments on draft laws, thereby contributing to
public debate.56
The ECHR stated that the reasoning standing behind
such an interpretation can be based on the fact that the
state’s monopoly on information actually interferes with
the activities performed by NGOs as social ‘watch-
dogs’.57
When explaining the threshold criteria, which need to
be fulfilled in order to evoke the right to access
information in the case Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v.
Hungary, the ECHR enumerates four conditions. First-
ly, ‘the purpose of the person in requesting access to the
information held by a public authority is to enable his or
her exercise of the freedom to “receive and impart
52. Analysed in detail below.
53. Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, ECHR (2009) No. 37374/05.
54. Ibid., para. 35.
55. Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung
Eines Wirtschaftlich Gesunden Land- und Forst-Wirtschaftlichen
Grundbesitzes v. Austria, ECHR (2013) No. 39534/07.
56. Ibid., para. 36.
57. ‘…stating that the most careful scrutiny was called for when authorities
enjoying an information monopoly interfered with the exercise of the
function of a social watchdog’ – ibid., para. 41.
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information and ideas” to others’.58 This illustrates sub-
sidiary character of the right to access information as a
provision included in the Article, which reflects on the
freedom of expression. Therefore, as explained in the
Sub-Section 4.3., the special role of media and NGOs
when executing the right to access information must be
stressed. Secondly, the information, data or documents
to which access is sought must meet a public interest
test.59 The ECHR does not elaborate on the conditions
that shall be fulfilled in order to comply with this test,
claiming that this definition ‘depend[s] on the circum-
stances of each case’.60 I hypothesise on the possible
meaning of this test in regard to the algorithms in the
Sub-Section 4.2. Thirdly, ‘an important consideration is
whether the person seeking access to the information in
question does so with a view of informing the public’.
This functional approach towards the information
requested was envisioned in the above-mentioned case
law. It also strengthens the position of media and NGOs
as natural candidates for seeking access to the
information in purpose of informing the public (see
Sub-Section 4.3.). Additionally, the ECHR notes that
the fact that the information requested is ready and
available ought to constitute an important criterion in
the overall assessment of whether a refusal to provide
the information can be regarded as an ‘interference’
with the freedom to ‘receive and impart information’
as protected by that provision.61
I refer to this condition in Sub-Section 4.2.
Such conditions provide an argument that is crucial
when analysing the possibility of using the right to
information as an alternative to the right to explanation.
The role of the state as a guarantee of the right to
information – seen from the perspective of the ECHR
judgements – has evolved. From being viewed as a
purely passive actor, whose function was not to disturb
the flow of information,62 state may be considered more
active player if state monopoly of information is under
consideration.63 The shift in the ECHR’s interpretation
58. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, above n. 49, para. 158.
59. Ibid., para. 161.
60. Ibid., para. 162.
61. Ibid., para. 170.
62. The example of such an approach: ‘The Court observes that the right to
freedom to receive information basically prohibits a Government from
restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may
be willing to impart to him’ – Leander v. Sweden, ECHR (1987) No.
9248/81, para. 74; or: ‘That freedom cannot be construed as imposing
on a State, in circumstances such as those of the present case, positive
obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion’ –
Guerra and Others v. Italy, ECHR (1998) No. 14967/89, para. 53. The
fact that state is under no circumstances obliged to disseminate
information of its own motion has been confirmed in Magyar Helsinki
Bizottság v. Hungary, above n. 49, para. 156. The tension between lack
of positive obligations from the state’s side and its more active role pro-
moted by the above-mentioned judgements probably will result with
continuation of the case law explaining the conditions that should be
met when using the right to access information, for example, what is
information of public interest? How to address the state’s monopoly of
information?
63. Simultaneously not being obliged to perform information activities out
of its own motion, see above n. 62.
of Article 10 of the European Convention and towards
the relationship between the state and the guards of
democratic values embodied by the media and NGOs
could have an impact on the right to access information
in regard to digital space. However, the possibilities and
limits of such a concept in regard to algorithms need to
be explored. In the next sub-section, I present the issues
that should be considered in order to apply Article 10 to
scrutinise or prevent discriminatory treatment when
applying automated decision-making technologies.
4.2 Right to Access Information in Digital
Space: Algorithms as Information of Public
Interest
In order to examine the legal viability to apply the right
to access information to issues resulting from the devel-
opment of digital economy, three issues shall be consid-
ered. Firstly, I analyse whether algorithms on which
automated decision-making is based can be viewed as
information. Secondly, I examine the condition of being
information of public interest, as it may limit the extent
to which Article 10 can apply in regard to automated
decision-making. Thirdly, the character of information
that could potentially be received in case of automated
decision-making technologies should be identified.
The possibility of understanding an algorithm as an
information is based on the view that algorithms, in
their broad – and original – meaning, are chains of com-
mands, or, as Robin K. Hill briefly puts it, ‘finite,
abstract, effective, compound control structure’.64 Their
characteristics include ‘accomplishing a given purpose
under given provisions’.65 However, nowadays a seman-
tic shift from this purely theoretical sense towards a
more pragmatic meaning is taking place. In public dis-
course, the term algorithm usually refers to ‘the imple-
mentation and interaction of one or more algorithms in a
particular program, software or information system’.66
In both cases – the mathematical approach and the one
represented in public discourse – an algorithm can be
presented as a nexus: it allows for analysis of data and
gaining meaningful results. Therefore, it may be per-
ceived as information on how the process is organised.
The key element of applying Article 10 to automated
decision-making technologies is to disenchant algo-
rithms and view them simply as information on how the
architecture of automated decision-making processes
– irrespective of the level of their complexity – has been
designed, that is, which variables are considered as
meaningful. This perspective on the algorithm complies
64. R.K. Hill, ‘What an Algorithm Is’, 29 Philosophy & Technology 35, at 44
(2016).
65. Ibid., at 47. This understanding of algorithms implies that they do not
have to be even digitized: ‘Algorithms need not be software: in the
broadest sense, they are encoded procedures for transforming input
data into a desired output, based on specified calculations’ – T. Gilles-
pie, ‘The Relevance of Algorithms’, in T. Gillespie, P. Boczkowski &
K. Foot (eds.), Media Technologies, Essays on Communication, Materi-
ality, and Society (2014) 167, at 167.
66. B.D. Mittelstadt, P. Allo, M. Taddeo, S. Wachter, & L. Floridi, ‘The Eth-
ics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate’, Big Data & Society at 2
(2016).
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with the above-described condition of the requested
information being ‘ready and available’. On the basis of
the relevant case law, it is impossible to argue that the
state should provide the analysis of how automated deci-
sion-making solution works. Nevertheless, it could be
obliged to provide the access to the raw algorithm itself.
This might be perceived as a path to ensuring model-
centric explanation of automated decision-making solu-
tions to broader public.
Considering the second issue, this analysis is limited to
information of public interest, even though the automa-
ted decision-making process can refer to an infinite
number of issues. Due to, for example, the dominant
character of the ECHR’s case law regarding the right to
access information as well as above-mentioned conflict
of rights between the intellectual property rights and the
right to access information, my argument here is strictly
limited to the automated decision-making technologies
used by the state’s institution (the algorithms that
underpin operations of the state).67 Following the case
law of the ECHR, the condition that would have to be
fulfilled on demanding the access to information in
question is the existence of state’s ‘monopoly of
information,’68 which is described in the ECHR’s case
law as a form of censorship. The logic presented in the
ECHR’s case law runs as follow: in case of the refusal of
access to the information on how the system works, the
state who possessed ‘monopoly of information’ would
limit the possibilities on media and NGOs to exercise
their function of conducting informed public debate.
Therefore, the hypothesis of this article could be
applied to algorithms that determine the knowledge
about issues that constitute matters of public interest, as
their importance for the public debate may not be ques-
tioned.
I would suggest that the automated decision-making
technologies used to determine access to social benefits
or automatically assign juries could serve as possible
examples. I would argue that in case of automated deci-
sion-making solutions used to provide public services,
such as public insurance, public education or public
health services, the relevant algorithms could be subjec-
ted to the more proactive interpretation of the right to
information, which has been developed by the ECHR.
Not only do the states exercise information monopoly in
these areas, but their impact on public matters of special
interest to the society could also be considered as a rea-
67. It might be possible to broaden the scope of right to access information:
‘The Court has further emphasised the importance of the right to
receive information also from private individuals and legal entities.
While political and social news might be the most important
information protected by Article 10, freedom to receive information
does not extend only to reports of events of public concern, but covers
cultural expressions and entertainment as well….’: European Court of
Human Rights, Internet: Case-Law of the European Court of Human
Rights, 2011 (update: 2015), at 43 https:// bit. ly/ 2HYhITm (last visited
7 May 2018).
68. ‘The Constitutional Court’s monopoly of information thus amounted to
a form of censorship.; Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, above
n. 53, para. 28.
son for ensuring the transparency of the organisation
process.
This characteristic of the right to access information
shows the differences between approaching the right to
explanation from the perspective of data protection and
from the perspective of the right to access information.
Contrary to the GDPR-based approach, which ulti-
mately is focused on the effects of automated decision-
making for a particular individual, the approach based
on the right to information would allow for a more
abstract and general control of the mechanisms deter-
mining automated decision-making. Firstly, it could
justify access to the documents that regulate decision-
making procedures concerning groups of people, allow-
ing to apply a more collective perspective than the one
focused solely on the individual, as is the case with the
GDPR.69 Secondly, the collective dimension of the
right to access information is strictly linked to the spe-
cial position of the media and NGOs in executing the
freedoms and rights guaranteed in Article 10 of the
European Convention, to which is dedicated the next
sub-section.
4.3 Who Is a ‘We’? Media and Non-
Governmental Organisations as Citizens’
Representatives
It should not be overlooked that the processing of big
data is based on mechanisms that allow for dividing
individuals into groups that have certain common char-
acteristics. The collective character of the potential
discrimination seems to be an inescapable argument,
tilting the scale for the possibility of recognising the
right to information as an alternative to the tightly
restricted right to explanation implemented in the
GDPR. The special position of the media and NGOs
has been stressed by the ECHR in numerous judge-
ments and has been approached from the functional
perspective:
However, the function of creating forums for public
debate is not limited to the press. That function may
also be exercised by non-governmental organisations,
the activities of which are an essential element of
informed public debate.70
69. Even though data protection may provide tools that to certain extent
allow auditing the processes standing behind automated decision-mak-
ing, they are mostly of voluntary or self-regulatory character: above-
mentioned data-processing impact assessments and codes of conduct or
the possibility of establishing certification mechanisms, the latter two
not having obligatory character. For presentation of this possibilities see:
B.W. Goodman, ‘A Step Towards Accountable Algorithms? Algorithmic
Discrimination and the European Union General Data Protection’, 29th
Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2016), at
4-5 https:// bit. ly/ 2rlBzSf (last visited 7 May 2018).
70. Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung
Eines Wirtschaftlich Gesunden Land- und Forst-Wirtschaftlichen
Grundbesitzes v. Austria, above n. 55, para. 34. See also: ‘However,
the realisation of this function is not limited to the media or professional
journalists. In the present case, the preparation of the forum of public
debate was conducted by a non-governmental organisation. The pur-
pose of the applicant’s activities can therefore be said to have been an
essential element of informed public debate’ – Társaság a Szabadságjo-
gokért v. Hungary, above n. 53, para. 27.
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The unique position of media and NGOs in regard to
the right to access information is firmly embedded in
case law concerning the right to access information. As
the actors whose function is enabling and participating
in the informed debate, their primary task is to provide
the information to the broad public. Therefore, they
fulfil the conditions set out by the ECHR in regard to
recognition of the right to access information. The judi-
ciary practice of the ECHR continuously recognises a
special role of the media and non-governmental organi-
sations as guards of democracy and somehow privileged
actors in terms of executing rights included in Article 10
of the European Convention.71 Not only are they per-
ceived by the ECHR as actors whose mission is to
inform the public on most important issues, but they are
also legitimised to demand access to public information
from the governmental institutions in order to inform
broader public. They seem to be the subject most befit-
ting this function: as they are the representatives of civil
society, the impact of their actions should be more fruit-
ful than legal actions undertaken solely by individuals.
Moreover, one of the obstacles mentioned in the intro-
duction to this article that limits the transparency of the
implemented solutions is the lack of adequate digital lit-
eracy of individuals. Specialised NGOs72 or well-
informed journalists could instead act as intermediaries
between the individual and the decision makers (or shall
we say, decision-making automated solutions).
The presence of such representatives as NGOs is crucial
for ensuring fairness and non-discriminatory treatment
when applying automated decision-making.73 The
potential of using traditional importance of the media
and NGOs in regard to the right to access information
allows, as I argue, for the possibility of bringing the
issue of automated decision-making to the collective
dimension understood as a right to model-centric
71. For the analysis of the role of media in the ECHR’s case law concerning
Art. 10 see: T. Mendel, A Guide to the Interpretation and Meaning of
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2017), at
14-17 https:// bit. ly/ 2OwOACd (last visited 30 July 2018).
72. It is worth to note that in the Art. 80 of the GDPR the conditions that
the organisation representing the individual has to meet include: ‘…and
is active in the field of the protection of data subjects’ rights and free-
doms with regard to the protection of their personal data’. This element
may limit the number of organisations that would be allowed to repre-
sent the individuals in cases initiated in order to ensure the execution of
the right to explanation based on the GDPR’s provisions – Art. 80(1),
above n. 3.
73. Moreover, it is necessary to admit that the analysis is partly inspired by
a ruling of the Polish Voivodship Administrative Court in Warsaw,
which decided that algorithms could be treated as public information
and which was initiated by the Polish non-governmental organisation
Panoptykon. The case regarded algorithms that are involved in provid-
ing services for the unemployed. It allowed dividing them into three
groups, which determined the scope of support granted to each individ-
ual. The administrative court decided that the mechanism that formed
the basis for the classification should be revealed accordingly to the reg-
ulations concerning public information. Judgement of WSA in Warsaw,
II SAB/Wa 1012/15, 5 April 2016. Moreover, recently the case con-
cerning the access to the algorithm determining the System of Random
Allocation of Cases has been initiated: K. Izdebski, ‘Algorithms of Fair-
ness’, Medium, 15 February 2018 https:// bit. ly/ 2GeO7zH (last visited
30 July 2018). In the moment of preparing this article, the outcome of
the proceeding has been unknown.
explanation. Instead of focusing on the explanation of a
decision referring to one particular individual, it could
focus on the architecture of the system used to deter-
mine the automated decision-making rules. It answers
the systemic challenges created by the automated deci-
sion-making solutions. It provides the organisations rep-
resenting certain groups with power to question the fair-
ness of the system created to determine automated deci-
sion-making solutions. However, even their privileged
position should be subjected to certain limitations,
which I examine in the next sub-section.
4.4 Limits of Right to Access Information in
Digital Space
The consequences of applying Article 10 to algorithms
that determine automated decision-making in case of
state’s operations bring up the necessity to analyse limi-
tations imposed on the right to information by the Euro-
pean Convention itself. I would argue that the right to
access information, as understood by the ECHR, can
refer to the state’s areas of activity. The examples of
operations included in the scope of this article’s hypoth-
esis could include automated decision-making systems,
which determine access to public services (e.g. unem-
ployment benefits).74
However, according to Article 10(2) the exercise of free-
doms guaranteed by Article 10 may be subject to restric-
tions prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic
society, among others, in the interest of national security
and public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health, and for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence.75
In the above-mentioned case Österreichische Vereinigung
zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung Eines Wirtschaft-
lich Gesunden Land- und Forst-Wirtschaftlichen Grundbe-
sitzes v. Austria,76 the ECHR analysed in detail if the
interference with the applicant association’s right to
receive and to impart information as enshrined in Arti-
cle 10(1) was justified on grounds offered by Article
10(2), namely, prescribed by law, pursuing one or more
of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph77 and
necessary in a democratic society. The conclusion of the
judgement in this aspect may be perceived as a test of
conditions that have to be met in order to be able to law-
fully refuse providing the information: according to the
ECHR, the refusal was prescribed by law and pursued
74. Niklas, Sztandar-Sztanderska & Szymielewicz, above n. 15.
75. Art. 10(2), above n. 7.
76. Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung
Eines Wirtschaftlich Gesunden Land- und Forst-Wirtschaftlichen
Grundbesitzes v. Austria, above n. 55.
77. The catalogue of the legitimate aims is included in the Art. 10(2) – ‘The
exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibil-
ities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or pen-
alties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for pre-
venting the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’: Art. 10(2),
above n. 7.
188
ELR december 2018 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000116
the legitimate aims. However, it was not considered by
the ECHR as necessary in a democratic society:
the reasons relied on by the domestic authorities in
refusing the applicant association’s request for access
to the Commission’s decisions – though ‘relevant’ –
were not ‘sufficient’. While it is not for the Court to
establish in which manner the Commission could and
should have granted the applicant association access
to its decisions, it finds that a complete refusal to give
it access to any of its decisions was disproportion-
ate.78
Tensions between the technological possibilities offered
in areas such as health insurance (e.g. adjusting an offer)
or crime prevention and the execution of the right to
information are impossible to avoid. Time will show
how the ECHR will resolve the issue of setting the
boundaries between the right to access information and
the state’s justified interests to protect its activities.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the test of conditions that
should be met when justifying the refusal of information
applied in Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung,
Stärkung und Schaffung Eines Wirtschaftlich Gesunden
Land- und Forst-Wirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. Aus-
tria79 proves that the condition of being ‘necessary in a
democratic society’ included in Article 10(2) may lead to
possible restrains of the right to access information.
5 Conclusions: The Right to
Access Information and the
Rule of Law in the Digital
Space
The necessity to rethink what is information and how it
should be treated is growing because of the spreading of
automated decision-making technologies and big data
analyses. Moreover, the datasets used for such analyses
are constantly growing, and ‘the Big Data of today can
easily become the little data of tomorrow.’80 There is a
strong need to confront the methods applied to such
analyses with the general prohibition on discrimination,
which is crucial to ensure the democratic fundaments of
European countries. As Hildebrandt claims,
The Rule of Law aims to create an institutional envi-
ronment that enables us to foresee the legal effect of
what we do, while further instituting our agency by
stipulating that such effect is contestable in a court of
law – also against big players (…) Such a – procedur-
78. Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung
Eines Wirtschaftlich Gesunden Land- und Forst-Wirtschaftlichen
Grundbesitzes v. Austria, above n. 55, para. 47.
79. Ibid.
80. P. Casanovas, L. De Kokerl, D. Menderson, & D. Watts, ‘Regulation of
Big Data: Perspectives on Strategy, Policy, Law and Privacy’, 7 Health
and Technology 335, at 337 (2017).
al – conception of the Rule of Law implies that both
automation and autonomics should be constraint in
ways that open them up to scrutiny [emphasis of the
author] and render their computational judgements
liable to being nullified as a result of legal proceed-
ings.81
The usage of right to access information could ‘open up
to scrutiny’ at least certain automated decision-making
solutions and provide the citizens with the answers
whether the decisions that are made in their cases have
been taken on grounds, which include potentially dis-
criminatory criteria. The ongoing digital transformation
seems to leave no time for the adequate lex speciali regu-
latory solutions to develop. Therefore, it is worth con-
sidering if the ones already existing cannot provide us
with innovative answers to the new challenges, using
their dynamic interpretation. I argue that when facing
the challenges created by the automated decision-mak-
ing solutions, the existing right to information can serve
as a way of improving the current state of the art.
Rethinking the character of the right to access
information in the light of the debate on the right to
explanation may be seen as a step towards an updated,
dynamic interpretation of a well-known human rights
acts’ provision. In absence of solutions focused strictly
on automated decision-making technologies, the right to
access information sets the fundaments for a technologi-
cally neutral regulatory framework that may prove to be
useful when preventing discriminatory treatment by
technological solutions, which few seem to understand
whilst all may be subjected to their decisions.
81. M. Hildebrandt, ‘The New Imbroglio – Living with Machine Algorithms’,
in L. Janssens (ed.), The Art of Ethics in the Information Society. Mind
You at 56 (2016) https:// bit. ly/ 2wn0b1I (last visited 8 May 2018).
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